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Abstract
We develop a life-cycle model of the labor market in which di¤erent worker-rm
matches have di¤erent quality and the assignment of the right workers to the right rms
is time consuming because of search and learning frictions. The rate at which workers
move between unemployment, employment and across di¤erent rms is endogenous
because search is directed and, hence, workers can choose whether to seek low-wage
jobs that are easy to nd or high-wage jobs that are hard to nd. We calibrate our
theory using data on labor market transitions aggregated across workers of di¤erent
ages. We validate our theory by showing that it predicts quite well the pattern of
labor market transitions for workers of di¤erent ages. Finally, we use our theory to
decompose the age proles of transition rates, wages and productivity into the e¤ects
of age variation in work-life expectancy, human capital and match quality.
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1 Introduction
The US economy displays a great deal of labor reallocation, in the sense that workers move
frequently between employment, unemployment and across di¤erent employers. For example,
the rate at which unemployed workers become employed (henceforth, the UE rate) is close
to 25 percent per month, the rate at which employed workers become unemployed (the EU
rate) is approximately 0.5 percent per month, and the rate at which workers move from one
employer to another (the EE rate) is approximately 1.8 percent per month.1 However, these
aggregate transition rates hide dramatic di¤erences in the extent of labor reallocation for
workers of di¤erent ages. For example, among workers of age 20 to 25, the monthly UE rate
is 28 percent, the EU rate is 1.5 percent and the EE rate is 3.5 percent. Among workers of
age 40 to 45, the monthly UE rate is 25 percent, the EU rate is 0.4 percent and the EE rate
is 1.8 percent. And among workers of age 55 to 60, the monthly UE, EU and EE rates are,
respectively, 18 percent, 0.2 percent and 1.5 percent.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the di¤erences in the extent and pattern of labor
reallocation of young, middle-aged and old workers. To this end, we develop a life-cycle model
of the labor market in which di¤erent worker-rm matches have di¤erent productivity and
the allocation of the right workers to the right rms is a time-consuming process because
of search frictions in the spirit of Mortensen (1970) and learning frictions in the spirit of
Jovanovic (1978). On one side of the labor market, rms choose how many and what type
of vacancies to open, where the type of a vacancy is dened by the conditions under which
it hires a worker and by the value of the employment contract that it o¤ers to a new hire.
On the other side of the labor market, both employed and unemployed workers choose which
type of vacancy to seek. In this sense, the search process is directed. The workers and the
rms who seek and o¤er the same type of vacancy come together through a frictional process
described, in reduced form, by a constant return to scale matching function. When workers
and rms match, they begin production and eventually learn the quality of their union.
In equilibrium, all workers face a choice between searching for vacancies that o¤er rela-
tively higher wages and searching for vacancies that are relatively easier to nd. The choices
1The gures reported in this introduction are constructed from the 1996 panel of the U.S. CensusSurvey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for men with a high school degree. We refer the reader to
Section 3 for further details about the data.
2
faced by a particular worker depend on his age and experience. Specically, if the age and
experience of the worker make him a more valuable production partner, he will face a higher
probability of nding vacancies o¤ering any value. The preferences of a particular worker
over the probability of nding a vacancy and the value o¤ered by a vacancy depend on the
workers employment position (i.e., unemployment or employment in a match of a given
quality). Specically, if the worker is in a more valuable employment position, he will have a
stronger preference for vacancies that o¤er higher value and are harder to nd. Overall, the
age, experience and employment position of a worker determine his optimal search strategy
and, consequently, the velocity at which he moves across employment states.
We calibrate the model using aggregate data on labor reallocation, such as the uncondi-
tional mean of the UE, EU and EE rates and the mean of the EU and EE rates conditional
on tenure. The calibration reveals that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the quality
of rm-worker formed matches. For example, a match in the 90th percentile of the quality
distribution is approximately 3 times more productive than a match in the 10th percentile.
The search frictions that slow down the process of assignment of the right workers to the
right rms are modest, in the sense that workers are almost always able to search the labor
market and that rms pay a relatively small cost to open new vacancies. For example, the
expected vacancy cost that a rm has to incur to hire a middle-aged unemployed worker is
approximately equal to 2 months of the workers output. Similarly, the learning frictions are
modest, in the sense that rms and workers learn rather quickly the quality of their match.
On average, it takes 4 months for a rm and a worker to learn the quality of their match.
Overall, the large heterogeneity in match quality and the modest search and learning fric-
tions add up to generate a rather time-consuming process of assignment of the right workers
to the right rms.
In order to validate the calibrated model, we use data on labor reallocation disaggregated
according to the workersage. In particular, we show that the calibrated model predicts quite
well the mean of the UE, EU and EE transition rates conditional on the workersage. We
then use the model to decompose the overall e¤ect of age on the transition rates into the e¤ect
of three characteristics that di¤er between older and younger workers: work-life expectancy,2
2Throughout the paper, we dene work-life expectancy as the expected time before a worker exits the
labor market.
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Figure 1: UE lifecycle profile
experience and selection into matches of di¤erent quality. We nd that the decline in the
UE rate experienced by workers between the ages of 50 and 65 (see Figure 1) is mainly due
to the decline in the workerswork-life expectancy, which reduces their value to the rms
as production partners. We nd that the decline in the EU rate experienced by workers
between the ages of 20 and 30 (see Figure 2) is mostly due to their transition from low to
high quality matches, which reduces their incentive to move into unemployment. Moreover,
we nd that the steady decline in the EE rate that takes place throughout the life cycle (see
Figure 3) is caused initially by the increase in the quality of the workersmatches and later
by the decline in the workerswork-life expectancy.
Finally, we use the model to identify the causes of productivity and wage growth over
the life cycle. We nd that almost all of the life-cycle growth in labor productivity takes
place during the rst ten years of the work-life, and that approximately 76 percent of this
growth is due to increases in the workersexperience and 24 percent is due to improvements
in the quality of the workersmatches. Similarly, we nd that almost all of the life-cycle
growth in wages takes place early in a workers career. Approximately 75.9 percent of this
wage growth is due to increases in workersexperience, 23.9 percent is due to increases in the
4
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
18 25 35 45 55 65
Age
High school (raw) High school(smooth)
All males (raw) All males (smooth)
Figure 2: EU lifecycle profile
quality of the workersmatches and only 0.2 percent is due to improvements in the terms of
the workersemployment contracts.
The analysis is carried out using a general equilibrium model for two reasons. First, a
general equilibrium model is easier to calibrate than a partial equilibrium model because
more variables are determined endogenously. For instance, our general equilibrium model
predicts based on very few parameters what types of contracts rm will o¤er to workers of
di¤erent age and experience. In contrast, a partial equilibrium model that takes the behavior
of the rms as given is silent on the matter. For this reason, one would need to collect data on
the contracts o¤ered by rms to di¤erent types of worker in order to calibrate such a partial
equilibrium model, but not to calibrate our model. Moreover, a general equilibrium model
can be used to study the impact of aggregate shocks, the e¤ect of labor market policies and,
in general, to do counterfactual analysis. While we do not engage in any of these exercises
here, several follow-up papers did (see, e.g., Guo 2014 and Wee 2014).
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, the paper contributes to the
literature on directed search pioneered by Montgomery (1991), Moen (1997), Shimer (1996)
and Burdett, Shi andWright (2001) and recently developed by Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman
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Figure 3: EE lifecycle profile
(2006), Shi (2009), Galenianos and Kircher (2010), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) and Menzio
and Shi (2011). Relative to the existing literature, we are the rst to introduce workersage
and experience heterogeneity in a model of directed search on the job. In equilibrium,
we nd that workers characteristics and employment status a¤ect the resolution of the
trade-o¤ between the probability of nding a vacancy and the value o¤ered by a vacancy.
Moreover, we show that these e¤ects are su¢ cient to reproduce the empirical age prole of
the workerstransitions between employment, unemployment and across di¤erent employers.
We also generalize the theoretical results in Menzio and Shi (2011) by proving that the unique
equilibrium is block recursive and e¢ cient.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature that studies the pattern of workerstran-
sitions across employment states over the life cycle. Chéron, Hairault and Langot (2007,
2011) develop a life-cycle version of the search model by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
The paper assumes that search is random and that the quality of a match is observed with-
out delay (i.e. matches are inspection goods). While these assumptions a¤ord the authors
an elegant closed-form analysis and powerful insights into the behavior of the model, they
also generate a number of counterfactual predictions. For instance, the model implies that
the EU rate is increasing with age, while, in the US data, the EU rate is decreasing with
6
age. Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto (2011) build on Chéron, Hairault and Langot (2007) by
introducing a persistent component to match quality that, with some probability, is observed
before the creation of the match (i.e. matches are partly inspection and partly experience
goods and their quality is persistent). While the model matches quite well the age prole of
the UE and EU rates, it only does so under the ad-hoc assumption that matches between
rms and older workers are more likely to be inspection goods. In contrast, our model pre-
dicts the age prole of the UE, EU and EE rates not because the matching technology varies
with age, but because the resolution of the directed search trade-o¤ between the probability
of nding a vacancy and the value o¤ered by a vacancy varies with age.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature that combines search frictions and human
capital accumulation in an attempt to identify the causes of productivity and wage growth
over the life cycle. Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2014) develop and quantify a
human capital version of the random search model with dynamic auction model by Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2001, 2002). While their model is quite di¤erent from ours and so are
the data used to estimate it, their ndings are qualitatively similar.to ours. In particular,
they nd that human capital accumulation and the process of relocation from low to high
productivity jobs both account for large shares of the workerswage growth over the lifecycle,
while the improvement of terms of trade does not. Fu (2011) and Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela
and Coles (2011) and Burdett and Coles (2011) develop human capital versions of the model
of random search on the job by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). These papers are mainly
theoretical, and do not o¤er a decomposition of wage growth. Moreover, because they assume
that experience increases market and home productivity proportionally, the models in these
papers can be solved analytically, but have counterfactual implications regarding workers
transition rates. For example, they imply that the UE and EU rates are independent of age.3
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop our life-cycle
theory of labor reallocation. In particular, we lay out the environment, dene equilibrium,
prove the existence, uniqueness and e¢ ciency of the equilibrium and characterize the e¤ect
of work-life expectancy, experience and match quality on the workerspolicy functions. In
3We should also mention the literature that studies employment, hours and wages over the life-cycle in
the context of frictionless models of the labor market (see, e.g., Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert and Wright 2004
and reference therein).
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Section 3, we describe the data that we use to calibrate and validate our theory. In Section 4,
we quantify and apply our life-cycle theory of labor reallocation. In particular, we calibrate
and validate the model, and we decompose the age proles of the workerstransition rates,
productivity and wages. Section 5 concludes.
2 Lifecycle theory of labor reallocation
In this section, we develop a life-cycle model of the labor market with search and learning
frictions in the spirit of Menzio and Shi (2011). On one side of the market, rms choose how
many and what type of vacancies to open, where the type of a vacancy is dened by the
conditions under which it hires a worker and by the value of the employment contract that it
o¤ers to a new hire. On the other side of the labor market, workers choose the type of vacancy
towards which they direct their search. Due to the presence of search frictions, it takes time
for a worker to nd the type of vacancy he seeks. Due to the presence of learning frictions,
it takes time for a rm and a worker to learn the quality of their match. Because the search
process is directed, the velocity at which a worker moves across di¤erent employment states
(i.e. employment, unemployment and across di¤erent employers) depends on his age, human
capital and his current employment position. First, these characteristics a¤ect the trade-o¤
that the worker faces between the value o¤ered by a vacancy and the probability of nding
that vacancy. Second, these characteristics a¤ect the workers preferences over the value
o¤ered by a vacancy and the probability of nding it. Overall, the workers characteristics
determine whether the worker will seek vacancies that o¤er him lower wages but are easier
to nd or vacancies that o¤er more generous wages but are harder to nd.
2.1 Environment
The economy is populated by T overlapping generations of workers. In every period, a
new generation of workers is born into the economy and lives for T periods, where T  2
is an integer. Each worker is endowed with one indivisible unit of labor. Each worker
maximizes the expected sum of periodical consumption discounted at the factor  2 (0; 1).
The economy is also populated by a continuum of rms with positive measure. Each rm
operates a constant return to scale technology that turns one unit of labor into zg(y) units
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of output. The rst component of productivity, z, is specic to the rm-worker pair, and its
value lies in the set Z = fz1; z2; :::zN(z)g, where 0 < z1 < z2 < :::zN(z) and N(z)  2 is an
integer. The second component of productivity, g(y), is specic to the worker. Specically,
y 2 N denotes the experience of the worker (i.e. the number of periods in which the worker
has been employed) and g : N ! R+ is an increasing and concave function. Each rm
maximizes the expected sum of periodical prots discounted by the factor .
The labor market is organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by the triple
(x; y; t) 2 R  N2. Di¤erent submarkets di¤er with respect to the terms of trade o¤ered
by the rms and with respect to the supply and demand conditions. Specically, in sub-
market (x; y; t), rms hire workers of age t and experience y and o¤er them employment
contracts worth x in lifetime utility. We refer to (y; t) as the type of the worker. Moreover,
in submarket (x; y; t), the ratio of rms searching for workers to workers searching for rms
is t(x; y). Following Pissarides (1985), we refer to t(x; y) as the tightness of submarket
(x; y; t).
Time is discrete and continues forever. At the beginning of each period, the aggregate
state of the economy can be summarized by the tuple  = (n; u; e; ). The rst component of
 is a function n : N! R+, where n(t) denotes the measure of workers that have yet to enter
the labor market. We refer to these workers as non-participating. The second component is a
function u : N2 ! R+, where u(y; t) denotes the measure of workers of type (y; t) who are in
the labor market but are not employed. We refer to these workers as unemployed. The third
component is a function e : fz0 [ Zg  N2 ! R+, where e(z; y; t) denotes the measure of
workers of type (y; t) who are employed in a match of known quality z, and e(z0; y; t) denotes
the measure of workers of type (y; t) who are employed in a match of unknown quality. We
refer to employed and unemployed worker as participating workers. Finally,  2 R+ denotes
the current realization of the stochastic process for the measure of newly born workers.
Every period is divided into ve stages: entry-and-exit, separation, search, matching and
production. At the rst stage, a non-participating worker of age t enters the labor market
with probability t 2 [0; 1]. Similarly, a participating worker of age t permanently exits
the labor market with probability 1   t, t 2 [0; 1]. Without loss in generality, we assume
T+1 = 0.
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At the separation stage, an employed worker becomes unemployed with probability d 2
[; 1], where d is a probability determined by the workers employment contract and  2 [0; 1]
is the probability that the worker has to leave his job for exogenous reasons.
At the search stage, a worker has the opportunity to search the labor market with a
probability that depends on his employment state. In particular, if a worker is unemployed
at the beginning of the separation stage, he has the opportunity to search with probability
u 2 (0; 1]. If a worker is employed at the separation stage and has not lost his job, he has
the opportunity to search with probability e 2 (0; 1]. And if the worker lost his job during
the separation stage, he cannot search in the current period. Whenever a worker has the
opportunity to search, he chooses which submarket to visit. Also, during the search stage,
a rm chooses how many vacancies to create in each submarket. The cost of maintaining a
vacancy for one period is k > 0.
At the matching stage, the vacancies and the workers who are searching in the same
submarket come together through a frictional matching process. In particular, a worker
searching in submarket (x; y; t) meets a vacancy with probability p(t(x; y)), where p : R+ !
[0; 1] is a twice-di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave function with boundary
conditions p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1. Similarly, a vacancy searching in submarket (x; y; t)meets
a worker with probability q(t(x; y)), where q : R+ ! [0; 1] is a twice-di¤erentiable strictly
decreasing function such that q() = p()=, q(0) = 1 and q(1) = 0.4 When a rm and a
worker of type (y; t) meet in submarket (x; y; t), the rm o¤ers to the worker an employment
contract that is worth x in lifetime utility. If the worker rejects the o¤er, he returns to his
previous employment position (i.e. unemployment or employment at another rm). If the
worker accepts the o¤er, he leaves his previous employment position and enters a productive
match with the rm. At the end of the matching stage, nature draws the productivity of a
newly formed match from the distribution f(z). Moreover, with probability  2 [0; 1], nature
draws a new realization for the productivity of an existing match from the distribution f(z).
We assume that matches are experience goods, in the sense that rms and workers do not
immediately observe the realized value of z.
4As it is well-known, the probability p that a worker meets a vacancy and the probability q that a vacancy
meets a worker can be expressed as functions of the vacancy-to-worker ratio  if and only if the underlying
matching process features constant returns to scale.
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At the production stage, an unemployed worker of type (y; t) produces and consumes b
units of output. A worker of type (y; t) who is employed in a match of quality z produces
zg(y) units of output and consumes w of them, where w is the wage specied by the workers
employment contract. The worker and the rm observe their output with probability  2
(0; 1]. At the end of the production stage, nature draws the measure of next periods entering
cohort from the distribution (^j),  : R+ ! R+. Throughout the paper, the caret
indicates variables or functions in the next period.
To conclude the description of the model, we need to specify the details of the contractual
environment. In this paper, we assume that employment contracts are complete, in the sense
that they can specify the wage paid by the rm to the worker, w, the probability that the
worker and the rm break up at the separation stage, d, and the submarket where the
worker should search while employed by the rm, (xe; y; t), as a function of the history of
the rm-worker match and of the aggregate economy.
Given the assumption of complete contracts and the fact that utility is perfectly trans-
ferrable, it is easy to prove that the rms always nd it optimal to o¤er employment con-
tracts that are bilaterally e¢ cient, in the sense that these contracts maximize the sum of
the workers lifetime utility and the rms lifetime prots from forming a match. This re-
sult is formally established in Menzio and Shi (2011) and is easy to understand. A rm in
submarket (x; y; t) maximizes its prots by o¤ering an employment contract such that the
contingencies for d and xe deliver bilateral e¢ ciency and the contingencies for w deliver the
value x to the worker. Clearly, there are many contingencies for w that deliver the same
value x to the worker. The value x can be delivered through a wage that remains constant
throughout the duration of the employment relationship, by a wage that varies with the
workers tenure, or by a wage that varies with the workers productivity.5 For the purposes
of the theoretical part of the paper, we do not need to resolve this indeterminacy. In the
empirical part of the paper, we will assume that wages are set as a constant fraction of the
5In most search models with risk-neutral workers and rms, wages can only be pinned down with the help
of somewhat arbitrary assumptions about the process of wage determination. For example, in Pissarides
(1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), wages would not be uniquely pinned down if not for the arbitrary
assumption that wages need to be renegotiated in every period. In Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), wages
would not be uniquely pinned down if not for the assumption that rms are constrained to o¤er wages that
remains constant until the employee receives an outside o¤er.
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workers productivity. We shall refer to this constant fraction as the workers piece-rate.6
At this point, it is useful to briey discuss the main assumptions of our model. First,
we assume that the search process is directed, in the sense that vacant jobs specify the
requirements that a worker needs to satisfy in order to be hired as well as the value of the
contract o¤ered to a worker who is hired, and workers choose for which type of vacant job
to apply. The assumption of directed search seems natural, as workers are likely to know
the requirements and employment conditions of the jobs for which they apply.7 Second, we
assume that vacant jobs specify both the experience and the age requirements that a worker
needs to have in order to be hired.8 The assumption may seem strong, as in many countries
rms are legally forbidden from explicitly discriminate workers based on age. However, rms
have an incentive to circumvent these restrictions as older workers are less valuable, and may
easily circumvent these restrictions by rejecting applicants because of their age and claiming
they were rejected because of their quality.9 Third, we assume that employment contracts
are complete. We nd this assumption appealing not because we believe that rms and
workers literally sign complete contracts, but because we hold the view that matched rms
and workers will nd a way to behave so as to maximize their joint gains from trade. Fourth,
we assume that matches are experience goods. It is easy to characterize the properties of
an alternative version of the model in which matches are inspection goods, in the sense that
6We have carried out quantitative analysis of the model under two alternative specications of the wage
determination process: a xed-wage process and an incentive compatible process. In the case of the xed-
wage process, we assume that the wage remains constant throughout the entire duration of the employment
relationship. In the case of the incentive compatible process, we assume that the wages are such that the
worker nds it optimal to choose the separation and search strategies prescribed by the bilaterally e¢ cient
contract. That is, the incentive compatible process implements the prescriptions of the bilaterally e¢ cient
contract without requiring any commitment from the worker. We found that the predictions of the model
with respect to the age prole of UE, EU and EE rates under the two alternative specications of the wage
process are very close to those obtained for the piece-rate process. The only signicant di¤erence is with
respect to the production function g(y) required to match the age prole of wages.
7In a recent survey of the US labor market, Hall and Krueger (2008) nd that 84 percent of white, male,
non-college workers either knew exactly or had a pretty good idea about how much their current job
would pay from the very beginning of the application process (at the time of the rst interview).
8Assuming that the vacancy species the hiring conditions rather than a menu of contracts, one for a
worker of each type (i.e. age and experience), is without loss in generality. Indeed, Menzio and Shi (2010b)
show that a vacancy always nds it optimal to o¤er a menu of contracts such that, for all but one type of
workers, the value o¤ered to the worker is zero.
9It is important to notice that rms discriminate workers based on age also in random search models with
either bargaining (e.g. Chéron, Hairault and Langot 2007 or Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto 2011) or dynamic
auctions (Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002). In fact, young and old workers employed at the same rm, carrying
out the same tasks with the same productivity will be paid di¤erent wages because both the outside option
of the worker and the gains from trade between the rm and the worker depend on the workers age.
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rms and workers observe the quality of their match before deciding whether to start the
employment relationship. However, the version of the model where matches are inspection
goods does not t the data as well as the one version where matches are experience goods.10
Finally, by assuming that the workers utility function is linear in consumption, we abstract
from income e¤ects on workers search strategy. The fact that our model can reproduce
the age prole of workerstransition rates between employment, unemployment and across
employers suggests that income e¤ects are not a very important determinant of the search
behavior of workers over the lifecycle.11
2.2 Denition of Equilibrium
First, consider a worker of type (y; t) who is unemployed at the beginning of the production
stage. The workers lifetime utility Ut(y;  ) is such that
Ut(y;  ) = b+ E ^j 
h
Ut+1(y^;  ^) + uRt+1(y^;  ^)
i
; (1)
where y^ = y and
Rt+1(y^;  ^) = max
x
p(t+1(x; y^;  ^))
h
x  Ut+1(y^;  ^)
i
.
In the current period, the worker produces and consumes b units of output. In the next
period, the worker gets the opportunity to search the labor market with probability u. In
this case, the workers continuation utility is Ut+1(y^;  ^) +Rt+1(y;  ^), where Rt+1(y;  ^) is the
maximum with respect to x of the probability that the worker nds a job, p(t+1(x; y;  ^)),
times the value to the worker from nding a job, x Ut+1(y^;  ^). With probability 1 u, the
worker does not have the opportunity to search in the next period. In this case, the worker
remains unemployed and his continuation utility is Ut+1(y;  ^). We denote as xut+1(y^;  ^) the
10When matches are inspection goods, a worker transits from employment into unemployment for one of
two reasons. First, the workers match may be hit by the exogenous destruction shock . Second, the workers
match may be hit by the productivity shock, , and the new quality of the match may be su¢ ciently low to
warrant its destruction. Since these events occur with a probability that is independent of the quality of the
match, the workers hazard rate from employment to unemployment is independent of tenure (abstracting
from the e¤ect of tenure on human capital, which turns out to be relatively small for prime-age workers). In
the data, the hazard rate from employment to unemployment is sharply decreasing with tenure.
11We also abstract from the funding and payment of unemployment and retirement benets. As discussed
in Zhang and Faig (2012), this abstraction is approximately innocuous as long as workers are not too far
from risk neutral and unemployment and retirement benets are funded according to a scheme that is not
too far from actuarially fair.
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policy function associated with (1).
Second, consider a rm and a worker of type (y; t) who are in a match of known quality
z at the beginning of the production stage. The sum of the workers lifetime utility and the
rms lifetime prots, Vt(z; y;  ), is such that
Vt(z; y;  ) = zg(y)
+E ^j max
d2[;1]
n
dUt+1(y^;  ^) + (1  d)
h
Ez^jzVt+1(z^; y^;  ^) + eSt+1(z; y^;  ^)
io (2)
where y^ = y + 1 and
St+1(z; y^;  ^) = max
x
p(t+1(x; y^;  ^))
h
x  Ez^jzVt+1(z^; y^;  ^)
i
.
In the current period, the sum of the workers utility and the rms prot is zg(y), the
output of the match. At the separation stage of next period, the worker becomes unemployed
with probability d. In this case, the sum of the workers continuation utility and the rms
continuation prot is Ut+1(y^;  ^). At the search stage of next period, the worker does not have
the opportunity to search the labor market with probability 1  e. In this case, the worker
and rm remain matched and the sum of their continuation values is Ez^jzVt+1(z^; y^;  ^) =
Vt+1(z0; y^;  ^) + (1   )Vt+1(z; y^;  ^), where  is the probability that the match is hit by a
quality shock and Vt+1(z0; y^;  ^) is the value to the rm and the worker from a match of
unknown quality. At the search stage of next period, the worker gets the opportunity to
search the labor market with probability e. In this case, the sum of the workers continuation
utility and the rms continuation prot is St+1(z; y^;  ^) + Ez^jzVt+1(z^; y^;  ^). Since contracts
are assumed to be complete, the destruction probability d and the on-the-job search strategy
x are chosen to maximize the joint value of the match to the rm and the worker. We denote
as dt+1(z; y^;  ^) and xet+1(z; y^;  ^) the optimal choices associated with (2).
Third, consider a rm and a worker of type (y; t) who are in a match of unknown quality
at the beginning of the production stage. The sum of the workers lifetime utility and the
rms lifetime prots, Vt(z0; y; t), is such that
Vt(z0; y;  ) = 
P
z Vt(z; y;  )f(z) + (1  )
P
z zg(y)f(z)
+(1  )E ^j max
d2[;1]
n
dUt+1(y^;  ^) + (1  d)
h
Vt+1(z0; y^;  ^) + eSt+1(z0; y^;  ^)
io
.
(3)
With probability , the rm and the worker observe the quality of their match in the current
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period. In this case, the expected sum of the workers lifetime utility and the rms lifetime
prot is
P
z Vt(z; y;  )f(z). With probability 1 , the rm and the worker do not discover
the quality of their match in the current period. In this case, the sum of the workers lifetime
utility and the rms lifetime prot is given by the second line of (3), which is the analogue
of (2) for a match of unknown quality. We denote as dt+1(z0; y^;  ^) and xet+1(z0; y^;  ^) the
policy functions associated with (3).
Finally, the tightness of the submarket is such that
k  q(t(x; y;  )) [Vt(z0; y;  )  x] (4)
and t(x; y;  )  0 with complementary slackness. The above condition guarantees that the
tightness function t is consistent with the rms incentive to create vacancies. The cost to a
rm from opening a vacancy in submarket (x; y; t) is given by k. The benet to a rm from
opening a vacancy in submarket (x; y; t) is given by the product between the probability that
the rm lls the vacancy, q(t(x; y;  )), and the value to the rm from lling the vacancy,
Vt(z0; y;  )   x. Condition (4) states that, if the vacancy-to-applicant ratio in submarket
(x; y; t) is strictly positive, the cost from opening a vacancy must be equal to the benet.
Moreover, condition (4) states that, if the vacancy-to-applicant ratio in submarket (x; y; t)
is equal to zero, the cost to a rm from opening a vacancy must be smaller or equal to the
benet.
We are now in the position to dene a Block Recursive Equilibrium (see Shi 2009 and
Menzio and Shi 2010, 2011).
Denition: A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of a market tightness function,
t, a value function for the unemployed worker, Ut, a policy function for the unemployed
worker, xut , a value function for the rm-worker match, Vt, and a policy function for the rm-
worker match, (dt; xet ), for each t = 1; 2; :::T: These functions satisfy the following conditions:
(i) Ut, Vt, t, xut , x
e
t and dt are independent of  ; (ii) t satises (4) for all (x; y;  ) 2 RN	
and t = 1; 2; :::T ; (iii) Ut and xut satisfy (1) for all y 2 N and t = 1; 2; ::::T ; (iv) Vt, dt and xet
satisfy (2) and (3) for all (z; y;  ) 2 fz0 [ Zg  N	 and t = 1; 2; :::T .
In words, a Block Recursive Equilibrium is a recursive equilibrium in which the agents
value and policy functions do not depend on the aggregate state of the economy  , which is
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given by the distribution of workers across age, experience and employment states, (n; u; e),
and the demographic shock, .
2.3 Existence, uniqueness and e¢ ciency of equilibrium
Theorem 1: (i) The unique recursive equilibrium is a BRE. (ii) The BRE is socially e¢ cient,
in the sense that it generates the same allocation that solves the problem of a utilitarian
social planner.
Proof : In the appendix.
Theorem 1 extends the results in Menzio and Shi (2011) to an economy in which workers
are heterogeneous not only with respect to their employment status (e.g. unemployed or
employed in a particular type of match) but also with respect to their age and experience.
The economics behind Theorem 1 is the same as in Menzio and Shi (2011). The equilibrium
is block recursive because search is directed. Intuitively, when search is directed, di¤erent
workers nd it optimal to search in di¤erent submarkets. As a result of this self-selection
process, a rm opening a vacancy in a particular submarket knows that it will only meet
applicants of a particular age, experience and employment status. Hence, the equilibrium
tightness in that submarket will depend on neither the distribution of workers over age,
experience and employment, nor on the demographic shock. Since the submarket tightness
is independent of the distribution of workers and of the demographic shock, the agents
value and policy functions will have the same property. Moreover, the equilibrium is e¢ cient
because employment contracts are complete and the search is directed. Intuitively, the
assumption of directed search guarantees that the creation of new matches is e¢ cient and
the assumption of complete contracts guarantees that the destruction of existing matches is
e¢ cient.
While the economics behind Theorem 1 is the same as in Menzio and Shi (2011), the
existence proof is di¤erent. In Menzio and Shi (2011), workers are innitely lived. For this
reason, proving the existence and uniqueness of a BRE requires showing that the equilibrium
conditions are a xed point of an operator that: (a) maps the set of value functions that are
independent of the workersdistribution into itself; (b) admits a unique xed point. In this
paper, workers are nitely lived. For this reason, we can prove the existence and uniqueness
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of a BRE by backward induction. From equations (1)-(3), it follows that the value functions
for a worker of age T does not depend on  . From equation (4), it follows that the tightness
of a submarket (x; y; T ) does not depend on  . Since VT , UT and T are all independent of  ,
equations (1)-(3) imply that the value functions for a worker of age T  1 are independent of
 , and equation (4) implies that the tightness of a submarket (x; y; T   1) is independent of
 . The argument can then be repeated to prove that all the other value and policy functions
are also independent of  .
Notice that a BRE is much easier to solve than a recursive equilibrium. In fact, solving
a recursive equilibrium amounts to solving a system of functional equations in which the
unknown functions (i.e., the agentsvalue and policy functions) have at least 1+T+T 2(N(z)+
2) arguments (i.e., the dimensions of the aggregate state  ). In contrast, solving for a
BRE amounts to solving for a system of functional equations in which the unknown value
function have at most two arguments (i.e. the dimensions of the individual state (z; y)).
Random search models are not block recursive. Hence, they are typically solved under
the (counterfactual) assumption of a constant population growth rate and in steady-state
(see, e.g., Chéron, Hairault and Langot 2007, Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela and Coles 2011 and
Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto 2014). In contrast, we can solve our model in the presence
of shocks to the population growth rate. Similarly, solving a random search model with
aggregate productivity shocks would be very di¢ cult. In contrast, our model would be easy
to solve, as the agentsvalue and policy functions would only depend on the realization of
the aggregate productivity shock and not on the distribution of workers across employment
states (see, e.g., Guo 2014 and Wee 2014).
2.4 Characterization of equilibrium
The assumption of directed search implies that a worker searching for a job faces a trade-
o¤ between the probability of receiving a job o¤er and the value o¤ered by the job o¤er.
The exact nature of the trade-o¤ faced by a worker depends on his type (i.e. age and
experience), as rms are willing to create more vacancies for those types of workers that
make more productive (or, generally, more valuable) employees. The preferences of a worker
over the probability and the value of a job o¤er depend on his current employment state (i.e.
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whether the worker is unemployed or employed in a match of a particular quality), as workers
who are in more valuable states face a smaller downside risk in case they do not receive the
o¤er. Overall, a workers choice of which job o¤ers to seek depends on his age, experience
and employment state. Hence, the velocity at which a worker moves from unemployment
to employment and from employer to employer also depends on his age, experience and
employment state. Similarly, the velocity at which a worker moves from employment to
unemployment depends on the value of his job relative to unemployment, which, in turn,
depends on the workers age and experience. From all these observations, it follows that, at
the aggregate level, the velocity at which workers of di¤erent age reallocate depends on their
distribution over experience and employment states. In the next paragraphs, we formalize
the arguments above and characterize the transition probabilities of di¤erent workers.
From equation (4), it follows that a worker of type (y; t) can choose to search in sub-
markets where the value o¤ered by vacancies to applicants, x, and the ratio of vacancies to
applicants, , are such that
x = Vt(z0; y)  k
q()
. (5)
The above equation states that, in a submarket with tightness , a worker of type (y; t) is
o¤ered a value x which is equal to the di¤erence between the value of a match between the
worker and a rm, Vt(z0; y), and the expected vacancy cost that a rm has to incur to create
a match with the worker, k=q(). Equation (5) implies that the worker faces a trade-o¤
between the likelihood of receiving a job o¤er and the value of a job o¤er. In particular, the
higher is the likelihood of receiving a job o¤er, p(), the lower is the value of a job o¤er,
x. Moreover, equation (5) implies that di¤erent types of workers face a di¤erent trade-o¤
between the likelihood and the value of a job o¤er. In particular, workers who generate more
valuable matches are more likely to receive a job o¤er of any value x.
From equations (1)-(3), it follows that the preferences over x and  for a worker who is
searching for a job are given by
p()(x  v), (6)
where v denotes the value of the workers current employment state (i.e. v equals Ut(y) if
the worker is unemployed and Ez^jzVt(z^; y) if the worker is employed in a match of quality
z). The above expression implies that workers in di¤erent employment states have di¤erent
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preferences over the likelihood of receiving a job o¤er, p(), and the value of a job o¤er, x. In
particular, the higher is the value of the workers current employment state v, the stronger is
the workers preference for job o¤ers that are relatively more generous and relatively harder
to get. This property of the workers preferences is intuitive, as workers who currently are
in a better employment state face a smaller downside risk if they do not get the job o¤er
they seek.
After substituting (5) into (6), we can write the search problem of a worker of type (y; t)
who is currently unemployed as
max
0
p() [Vt(z0; y)  Ut(y)]  k. (7)
Similarly, we can write the search problem of a worker of type (y; t) who is currently employed
in a match of quality z as
max
0
p()

Vt(z0; y)  Ez^jzVt(z^; y)
  k. (8)
Equation (7) states that an unemployed worker chooses the tightness of the submarket where
he looks for a job so as to maximize the probability that he nds a job, p(), times the surplus
that he generates by nding a job, Vt(z0; y) Ut(y), net of the cost of creating  vacancies, k.
Similarly, equation (8) states that an employed worker chooses the tightness of the submarket
where he looks for a new job so as to maximize the probability that he nds a new job, p(),
times the surplus that he generates by nding a new job, Vt(z0; y)  Ez^jzVt(z^; y); net of the
cost of creating  vacancies, k.
From (7), it follows that an unemployed worker of type (y; t) nds it optimal to search
in a submarket with tightness ut (y), where 
u
t (y) is such that
k  p0(ut (y)) [Vt(z0; y)  Ut(y)] (9)
and ut (y)  0 with complementary slackness. Equation (9) implies that ut (y) depends on
the surplus Vt(z0; y)  Ut(y) that the worker would generate if he were to nd a job, which
in turn depends on the workers age t and experience y. For the calibrated values of the
parameters (see Table 1), we nd that Vt(z0; y)  Ut(y) is increasing in y and decreasing in
t. These ndings are intuitive. A higher y increases Vt(z0; y)   Ut(y) because it increases
19
the di¤erence between the output of the worker in a job and at home. In contrast, a higher
t reduces Vt(z0; y)   Ut(y) because it lowers both the expected duration of the job and the
value of accumulating experience (as the worker has fewer years left to take advantage of it).
Given the properties of Vt(z0; y)   Ut(y), it follows from (9) that p(ut (y)) the probability
that an unemployed worker becomes employed is increasing in the workers experience y
and decreasing in the workers age t (see Figure 4).
From (8), it follows that an employed worker of type (y; t) nds it optimal to search in a
submarket with tightness et (z; y), where 
e
t (z; y) is such that
k  p0(et (z; y))

Vt(z0; y)  Ez^jzVt(z^; y)

(10)
and et (z; y)  0 with complementary slackness. Equation (10) implies that et (z; y) depends
on the surplus that the worker would generate if he were to nd a job, Vt(z0; y) Ez^jzVt(z^; y),
which in turn depends on the workers age, t, experience, y, and on the quality of his current
job, z. It is easy to prove that Vt(z0; y)   Ez^jzVt(z^; y) is decreasing in z. However, it is
di¢ cult to characterize analytically the e¤ect of y and t on Vt(z0; y)   Ez^jzVt(z^; y). For
the calibrated version of the model, we nd that the e¤ect of the workers experience y on
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Vt(z0; y) Ez^jzVt(z^; y) is positive if the worker is employed in a low-quality job, and negative
if the worker is employed in a high-quality job. This nding is intuitive since experience
increases (decreases) the di¤erence between the workers output in a job of unknown quality
and in a low (high) quality job. Similarly, we nd that the e¤ect of the workers age t
on Vt(z0; y)   Ez^jzVt(z^; y) is negative if the worker is employed in a low-quality job and
positive if the worker is employed in a high-quality job. This nding is also intuitive since
age decreases (increases) the di¤erence between the present value of the workers output
in a new job of unknown quality and in a low (high) quality job. From the properties of
Vt(z0; y)   Ez^jzVt(z^; y), we conclude that an employed worker moves from job to job with a
probability p(et (z; y)) that is decreasing in the quality of his current job. Moreover, if the
quality of his current job is low, an employed worker moves from job to job with a probability
p(et (z; y)) that is increasing in the workers experience and decreasing in the workers age
(see Figure 5).
Finally, we proceed to characterize the movements of workers from employment to un-
employment. From (2), it follows that an employed worker of type (y; t) moves into unem-
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ployment with probability dt(z; y) = 1 if
Ut(y) > eSt(z; y) + (1  e)Ez^jzVt(z^; y), (11)
and with probability dt(z; y) =  otherwise. The above expression is easy to understand.
The left-hand side of (11) is the value that the worker and his employer enjoy if the worker
moves into unemployment. The right-hand side of (11) is the value that the worker and his
employer enjoy if the worker stays on the job. When the left-hand side is greater than the
right-hand side, the worker and his employer nd it optimal to separate with probability
one. Otherwise, nature separates the worker and his employer with probability . Notice
that, since the right-hand side of (11) is strictly increasing in z and the left-hand side of (11)
is independent of z, the probability dt(z; y) can be represented by a reservation quality rt(y)
such that dt(z; y) = 1 if z < rt(y) and dt(z; y) =  if z  rt(y).
The reservation quality rt(y) depends on the workers experience y and age t. For the
calibrated values of the parameters, we nd that the reservation quality is increasing in t, it
is hump-shaped in y for younger workers and decreasing in y for older workers (see Figure
6). These ndings are intuitive. A higher t tends to lower the return from accumulating an
additional month of experience by staying on the job and, through this channel, it tends to
increase the reservation quality rt(y).12 A higher y has two countervailing e¤ects on rt(y).
On the one hand, a higher y tends to increase the di¤erence between the workers output
on the job and at home and, hence, it tends to lower rt(y). On the other hand, since g(y)
is concave, a higher y tends to lower the return from accumulating additional experience
by staying on the job. Through this channel, a higher y tends to increase rt(y). For young
workers, the second e¤ect dominates for low values of y, while the rst e¤ect dominates for
high values of y. For older workers, the remaining worklife is shorter and, hence, the return
12In models that abstract from search on the job and human capital accumulation, the separation decision
involves a trade-o¤ between the value of workers production in the current match and the sum of the value
of workers home production and the option value of searching for a better match. In these models, the
reservation quality rt(y) decreases with t because the option value of searching is lower for older workers. In
the calibrated version of our model, search on the job is almost as frequent as search o¤ the job and human
capital accumulation is important. Hence, in our calibrated model, the separation decision involves mainly
a trade-o¤ between the value of the workers home production and the sum of the value of the workers
production in the current match and the value of accumulating an additional month of experience. In our
model, the reservation quality rt(y) increases with t because the value of accumulating experience is lower
for older workers. This makes it clear why, even to understand the lifecycle path of the EU rate, one needs
to take into account on the job search and human capital accumulation.
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to additional experience is lower. For this reason, the rst e¤ect always dominates.
3 Labor reallocation data
In this section, we describe the data that we use to calibrate and validate our model of labor
reallocation over the life cycle. Moreover, we describe how, from these data, we construct
the age prole of the workerstransition rates across di¤erent employment states, the tenure
prole of the workerstransitions out of a job and the age prole of the workerswage.
3.1 Data and sample restrictions
We use the U.S. CensusSurvey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to calibrate
and evaluate our model of labor reallocation over the life cycle. The SIPP is a longitudinal
survey that follows the same individuals for periods up to four years. Each individual in the
survey is assigned to one of four rotation groups and is interviewed once every four months, in
a staggered fashion, for the duration of the panel. When all rotation groups are interviewed,
a wave of four months is completed, and a new wave is started with the interview of the rst
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rotation group. Each interview collects data on the individuals income and employment
status. For each week in the four months prior to the interview, the individual is asked
whether he was working in a job, absent without pay, or looking for a job. If the individual
reports to have had one or more job in a given month, he is asked about the identity of his
employers and about his wage with each employer. If the individual had multiple jobs, we
dene as the dominant job the one where he worked the most hours. If the individual did not
have a job and did not look for one, he is asked about the reason behind his non-participation
(i.e. education, illness, discouragement, retirement).
We restrict attention to the 1996 panel of the SIPP, which spans the period from Decem-
ber 1995 to February 2000. Moreover, we restrict attention to men between the ages of 18
and 66, who have a high school degree (and no further degree) and who do not own their own
business. Given these sample restrictions, we are left with 10,554 individuals and 300,234
monthly observations. We choose to focus on individuals in a particular education group
because the pattern of labor reallocation varies signicantly among workers with di¤erent
educational attainment, while these di¤erences are not captured by our model. We choose
to focus on individuals with a high school degree because they constitute the largest group
in our data and because they are representative of the median US worker.
At the beginning of each month, we assign to each individual an employment status. To
this end, we use the reports of the individual for the rst week of the month. We classify
the individual as employed (E) if he reports having a job and being either present or absent
without pay, either on layo¤ or not. We classify the individual as unemployed (U) if he
reports having no job, but looking for work actively or being on layo¤. We classify the
individual as not in the labor force (N) if he reports having no job, not actively looking and
not being on layo¤. Further, we assign to each employed worker an employer and a wage,
based on his dominant job.
3.2 Age prole of transitions within the labor force
The main objective of this paper is explaining the empirical age prole of workerstransitions
between employment, unemployment and across di¤erent employers. We construct these
empirical age proles as follows. First, we say that an individual experiences a UE transition
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in a given month if he is unemployed at the beginning of the month and employed at the
beginning of next month. Similarly, we say that an individual experiences an EU transition
if he is employed at the beginning of the month and unemployed at the beginning of the next
month. And we say that an individual experiences an EE transition if he is employed at
the beginning of the month and he is employed at some other rm at the beginning of next
month. Hence, we disregard individual transitions that take place at a frequency higher than
one month. We make this choice because, for computational tractability, our model period
is chosen to be a month rather than a week. Next, we dene the monthly UE transition
rate for workers of a given age as the fraction of unemployed individuals of that age who
experience a UE transition. Similarly, we dene the monthly EU rate for workers of a given
age as the fraction of employed workers of that age who experience an EU transition, and
the monthly EE rate as the fraction of employed workers who experience an EE transition.
Figure 1 displays the raw and smoothed age proles of the monthly UE rate. As one
can see, the monthly UE rate is approximately constant at 25 percent for workers between
the ages of 18 and 50, and it is declining for workers older than 50. One can also see that
the raw age prole becomes very noisy for workers older than 60 due to the small number
of high school graduates who are unemployed late in their work life. In order to assess the
robustness of the smoothed age prole for high school graduates, Figure 1 also displays the
smoothed prole for the entire male population.
Figure 2 displays the raw and smoothed proles of the monthly EU rate. As one can
see, the monthly EU rate is downward sloping throughout the life cycle, with a slope that
is markedly higher (in absolute value) for workers between the ages of 18 and 30 than for
workers between the ages of 30 and 65. The monthly EU rate is above 2 percent for 18 year
old workers, it is approximately 0.05 percent for 30 year old workers, and approximately 0.01
percent for 60 year old workers. Figure 2 also shows that the age prole of the EU rate for
the entire male population is almost the same as the one for high-school graduates.
Figure 3 plots the raw and smoothed proles of the monthly EE rate. As one can see,
the monthly EE rate is downward sloping throughout the life cycle, but the slope varies less
with age than the slope of the EU rate. The monthly EE rate is around 5 percent for 18
year old workers, it is approximately 2 percent for 35 year old workers, and approximately 1
25
percent for workers above the age of 60. Figure 3 also shows that the age prole of the EE
rate for the entire male population is almost the same as the one for high-school graduates.13
3.3 Age prole of transitions in and out of the labor force
There are not only large di¤erences in the frequency at which young and old workers move
between employment, unemployment and across di¤erent employers, but also large di¤er-
ences in the frequency at which young and old workers move in and out of the labor force.
In order to construct the age prole of workerstransitions in and out of the labor force, we
proceed as follows. First, we say that a worker experiences a transition into the labor force
(a NL transition) if he is out of the labor force at the beginning of the month and either
employed or unemployed at the beginning of next month. Similarly, we say that a worker
experiences a transition out of the labor force (a LN transition) if he is either employed or
unemployed at the beginning of the month and he is out of the labor force at the beginning
of next month. Next, we dene the NL transition rate for workers of a given age as the
fraction of non-participating workers of that age that experience a NL transition. We dene
the LN rate for workers of a given age in an analogous way.
Figure 7 displays the raw and smoothed age proles of the monthly NL rate. Notice that
the monthly NL rate is steadily decreasing with age. For example, the monthly NL rate is
close to 12.5 percent for workers who are 20 years old, it drops o¤ to 6 percent for workers
who are 40 years old, and it is lower than 2 percent for workers who are 60 years old. Figure
8 displays the raw and smoothed age proles of the monthly LN rate. The monthly LN
rate is U-shaped over the life cycle. The monthly LN rate is above 4 percent for very young
13The average UE and EU rate that we compute using the SIPP are below those computed by Shimer (2007)
and Gorry (2011) using the CPS. Moreover, Gorry (2011) nds the age prole of the UE rate is declining
throughout the entire lifecycle, while we nd that the UE rate is approximately constant for workers between
the age of 20 and 50. There are two reasons for these discrepancies. The rst reason has to do with the data.
Nagypal (2008) demonstrated, using CPS re-interview data, the presence of signicant classication error in
the CPS that misclassies out-of-labor-force workers as unemployed; she shows that this error overstates the
average UE rate, e.g., by 26%. SIPP does not have this problem. Moreover, Nagypal (2008) points out the
importance of mismatch (attrition) error in the CPS, which is also biased towards workers in their 20s. SIPP
data appears to be free of this error. The second reason for the discrepancy between our transition rates and
those reported by Shimer (2007) and Gorry (2011) has to do with the denition of these rates. Basically,
Shimer (2007) and Gorry (2011) dene the transition rates as the probability that a worker experiences
that type of transition during a month. In contrast, we dene the UE, EU and EE transition rates as the
probability that a worker is in a given employment state at the beginning of the month and in a di¤erent
employment state at the beginning of the next month. Clearly, our denition of transition implies lower
rates than the one adopted by Shimer (2007) and Gorry (2011).
26
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
18 25 35 45 55 65
Age
High school (raw) High school(smooth)
All males (raw) All males (smooth)
Figure 7: NL lifecycle profile
workers, it declines to about 1 percent for workers between the ages of 25 and 55, and it
increases to 2.5 percent for workers older than 60.
Our model can only account for some of the workerstransitions in and out of the labor
force. In our model, workers enter the labor force for exogenous reasons (e.g. the end of
their formal education), and they participate in the labor market until they permanently exit
the labor force for exogenous reasons (e.g. a permanent illness or a permanent productivity
decline). Hence, our model can account for the transition of young workers from school to
the labor force and for the transition of old workers from the labor force into retirement (as
long as one views retirement as the e¤ect of an exogenous decline in productivity). However,
our model does not allow participating workers to move out and back into the labor force.
Hence, our model cannot account for middle-aged workers who temporarily move out of the
labor force because of some temporary illness or because of discouragement.
In an attempt to minimize the discrepancy between the model and the data, we con-
structed a sample of the SIPP data from which we excluded workers who experience any
transitions out and into the labor force between the ages of 25 and 50. We found that there
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Figure 8: LN lifecycle profile
are not many such workers. That is, most of the transitions of prime-aged workers out and
into the labor force are attributable to a small number of marginally attached workers. More
importantly, we found that, in the restricted dataset, the age proles of the UE, EU and
EE rates, the age prole of wages and the tenure proles of the EU and EE rates are very
similar to those in the unrestricted dataset. This nding reassures us that leaving marginal
workers in the dataset will not have a signicant impact on our quantitative analysis.
3.4 Tenure prole of transitions within the labor force
To calibrate the parameters of our model, we will make use of the empirical relationship
between a workers tenure on a job and the probability that the worker moves into a di¤erent
job or into unemployment. Formally, we construct the tenure prole of the monthly EU and
EE rates as follows. The EU rate for workers of tenure  is dened as the number of employed
workers with tenure  who experience a EU transition in the subsequent month divided by
the number of employed workers with tenure  . Similarly, the EE rate for workers of tenure 
is dened as the number of employed workers with tenure  who experience an EE transition
in the subsequent month divided by the number of employed workers with tenure  .
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Figures 9 and 10 display the raw and smoothed tenure proles of the monthly EU and
EE rates. The tenure prole of the EU rate is decreasing and convex. The EU rate is close
to 2 percent for workers who have been on the job for 3 months; it drops to 0.5 percent for
workers with 24 months of tenure, and to 0.3 percent for workers with 48 months of tenure.
The tenure prole of the monthly EE rate displays a similar pattern. For workers with 3
months of tenure, the EE rate is close to 4 percent. The EE rate drops o¤ to 2 percent
for workers with 24 months of tenure, and it declines at a much lower rate for workers with
longer tenure. Notice that the shape of the tenure prole of the EU and EE rates that we
constructed using the SIPP is very similar to the shape of the tenure prole that Topel and
Ward (1992) construct using the NLSY.
3.5 Age prole of wages
To calibrate the parameters of our model, we will also make use of the empirical relationship
between a workers age and wage. Formally, we measure the wage of an employed worker
as the logarithm of the monthly wage and salary income at the workers dominant job. We
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then construct the age prole of wages by averaging our measure of wages across each age
group. The resulting age prole in gure 11 has the usual concave shape, increasing quickly
early in the life cycle, then increasing at a much slower rate after the mid-30s. As expected,
the population average wages are higher later in the life cycle than those of the high-school
education group, but the shape of the proles is similar.
4 Calibration, validation and application of the theory
In this section, we rst calibrate our model using aggregate data on labor reallocation, such
as the unconditional mean of the UE, EU and EE rates and the mean of the EU and EE
rates conditional on the workers tenure on the job. Second, we validate our calibrated model
by showing that it predicts quite well the mean of the UE, EU and EE rates conditional on
the workers age. Finally, we apply our calibrated model in order to decompose the e¤ect of
age on the UE, EU and EE rates into the e¤ect of changes in work-life expectancy, changes
in human capital and changes in match quality. Similarly, we use the calibrated model
to decompose the growth of wages and productivity over the life cycle into the e¤ect of
human capital accumulation, match quality accumulation and improvements in the workers
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contractual position.
4.1 Calibration
To begin the description of the strategy and outcome of the calibration, let us review the
parameters that describe our model. Preferences are described by the discount factor, , and
the value of leisure b. The production process is described by the probability distribution of
the quality of a match, f(z), the probability that the quality of a match is observed, , the
probability that the quality of a match changes, , and the production function, g(y). We
restrict f(z) to be a 100-point approximation of a Weibull distribution with mean 1, scale 
and shape . We also restrict g(y) to be of the form g(y) = (1  1) + 1y2. The matching
process is described by the vacancy cost, k, the probability that an unemployed worker gets
to search, u, the probability that an employed worker gets to search, e, the probability
that a worker becomes unemployed for exogenous reasons, , and the matching probability
p(), which we restrict to be of the form p() = minf1=2; 1g.14 We set u to 1, which is a
normalization that pins down the unit of measure for vacancies. The process of entry and
exit into the labor market is described by the probabilities ft; tg. Finally, the stochastic
process for the population of newly born workers is described by the distribution (^j).
Next, let us describe how we calibrate the parameters of the model. We set the model
period to be one month. We calibrate  so that the annual real interest rate in the model,
 12   1, is equal to 4 percent. We calibrate t so that the fraction of workers of age t
who enter the labor market is the same in the model as in the data. Similarly, we calibrate
t so that the fraction of workers of age t who retire from the labor market is the same in
the model as in the data. The remaining parameters are calibrated so as to minimize the
distance between the value of some statistical moments in the data and in the model. In
particular, the statistical moments that we consider are the average UE, EU and EE rates,
the average EU and EE rates for workers with di¤erent tenure, the average wage for workers
14Typically, the elasticity of the job nding probability function p with respect to  is estimated using
data on the cyclical uctuations of the UE rate and of the aggregate labor market tightness (see, e.g., Shimer
2005 and Menzio and Shi 2011). Since our model abstracts from cyclical uctuations, we did not attempt
to estimate the elasticity of p. Instead, we chose an elasticity of .5, which is close to the value estimated by
Menzio and Shi (2011) using a model of directed search on the job that is similar to ours. Moreover, as a
robustness check, we carried out the quantitative analysis of the model using two alternative values for the
elasticity of p (0.3 and 0.7) and found no signicant di¤erences with respect to the benchmark case.
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with di¤erent age, and the average wage-to-leisure ratio. Heuristically, the average UE, EU
and EE rates are used to calibrate the search parameters k,  and e. The tenure prole of
the EU and EE rate is used to calibrate the production parameters , ,  and . The age
prole of wages is used to calibrate the human-capital parameters 1 and 2. The ratio of
wages to home production which Hall and Milgrom (2008) estimate to be 0.7 is used to
calibrate the parameter b. Finally, since the equilibrium is block recursive, we do not need
to calibrate the distribution (^j).
Most of our calibration strategy is standard (see, e.g., Shimer 2005). The main novelty
is to use the empirical tenure prole of the EU and EE rates to calibrate the probability
distribution of match quality, f(z), and the parameters  and .15 Let us briey explain why
the tenure proles of the EU and EE rates are related to f(z),  and . In our model, when
a rm and a worker do not know the quality of their match, the probability that over the
next month the worker moves into unemployment is  and the probability that he moves
into another job is zero. When a rm and a worker know the quality of their match, the
probability that over the next month the worker moves into unemployment is dt(z; y) and
the probability that he moves into another job is (1   dt(z; y))ep(et (z; y)), where dt(z; y)
and p(et (z; y)) are decreasing in z. Therefore, the probability distribution of match quality,
f(z), the rate at which match quality is observed, , and the rate at which match quality
changes, , a¤ect the number of matches that reach a particular tenure and the fraction of
these matches that terminate because the workers move into unemployment or into another
job. Conversely, the empirical tenure prole of the EU and EE rates is informative about ,
 and f(z).
Finally, we turn to the outcomes of the calibration. Table 1 reports the calibrated values
of the model parameters. Tables 2, 3 and 4 report the values of the target moments in the
data and in the model. The calibrated values of the search parameters k,  and e are,
respectively, 23, .002 and .70. The calibrated value of k implies that the expected cost of
hiring an unemployed worker of age 40 with 15 years of experience is equal to 1.8 months
15Moscarini (2003) uses the tenure prole of the exit-hazard rate to calibrate the rate at which a rm and
a worker learn about the quality of their match. Similarly, Menzio and Shi (2011) use the tenure prole of
the exit-hazard rate to calibrate the match-quality distribution. In this paper, we use both the tenure prole
of the EU hazard and the tenure prole of the EE hazard to calibrate the parameters of the model.
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of the workers expected output.16 The calibrated value of  implies that only 1 out of 3
transitions from employment to unemployment are exogenous. The calibrated value of e
implies that the main reason why unemployed workers have a much higher job nding rate
than employed workers is that unemployed workers choose to search for jobs that o¤er lower
wages, not that unemployed workers are more likely to search. Given the calibrated values of
the search parameters, the average UE, EU and EE rates generated by the model are fairly
close to their empirical counterparts.
The calibrated values of  and  are, respectively, 11.2 and 3.5. These parameter values
imply that there is a great deal of uncertainty about the quality of a new match. For example,
the productivity of a match in the 90th percentile of the distribution f(z) is approximately
3 times higher than the productivity of a match in the 10th percentile of the distribution.
The calibrated value of  is .26, which implies that it does not take long to learn the quality
of a match. In particular, it implies that more than 70 percent of rms and workers learn
the quality of their match during the rst four months of their union. The calibrated value
of  is .0094, which implies that the quality of a match is very persistent. In particular, it
implies that, on average, the quality of a match changes once every 8 and a half years. Given
the calibrated value of these technology parameters, the model reproduces quite closely the
tenure proles of the EU and EE rates that are observed in the data (see Table 3). Intuitively,
the model features a large amount of uncertainty about the quality of a match in order
to capture through a selection e¤ect the decline of the empirical EE rate with tenure.
The calibrated model features a rather persistent, albeit not permanent, match quality in
order to capture the fact that the empirical EE rate becomes quite low, but not as low as
zero, as tenure increases. Finally, the calibrated model features a rather quick, albeit not
instantaneous, learning process for the quality of the match in order to capture the fact that
the empirical EU rate falls rather sharply, but not immediately, after a match is created.
The calibrated values of 1 and 2 are, respectively, 4.30 and .065. These values imply that
the e¤ect of an additional year of experience on a workers productivity falls dramatically with
the workers level of experience. For instance, the productivity of the worker approximately
doubles with the rst 2.5 years of experience, and only increases by about 25 percent with the
16This estimated cost is of the same order of magnitude as the direct measures of recruitment and training
costs reported by Silva and Toledo (2009).
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next 5 years of experience. Given the calibrated valued for 1 and 2, the model reproduces
quite closely the age prole of average wages (see Table 4).
The calibration reveals that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the quality of rm-
worker formed matches. The search frictions that slow down the process of assignment of the
right workers to the right rms are modest, in the sense that workers are almost always able
to search the labor market and that rms pay a relatively small cost to open new vacancies.
Similarly, the learning frictions are modest, in the sense that rms and workers learn rather
quickly the quality of their match. Overall, the large heterogeneity in match quality and the
modest search and learning frictions add up to a fairly time consuming process of selection
of the right workers into the right rms.
4.2 Validation
In order to validate our model, we use data on labor reallocation disaggregated according to
the workersage. In particular, we show that the calibrated model predicts quite well the
average of the EE, EU and UE transition rates conditional on the workersage.
4.2.1 Lifecycle prole of the EE rate
The age prole of the EE rate predicted by the model is quite close to the age prole of the
EE rate that is observed in the data (see Figure 12). The model correctly predicts that the
EE rate is decreasing throughout the life cycle and it correctly predicts the speed at which
it declines. Specically, the model correctly predicts that the EE rate drops rapidly for
workers between the ages of 20 and 35, that it remains approximately constant for workers
between the ages of 35 and 50, and that it declines for older workers. However, the model
underpredicts the EE rate by approximately 20% throughout the lifecycle. It is important
to notice that the proximity between the age prole predicted by the model and the one
observed in the data is a success of the theory. In calibrating the parameters of the model
we used the tenure prole of the EE rate, which, obviously, is related to the age prole of the
EE rate. However, since the tenure prole of the EE rate need not be constant for workers
of di¤erent age (and, in fact, it is not17) and the fraction of workers starting new jobs at
17Indeed, the tenure prole of the EE rate falls with age. For instance, the monthly EE rate after one year
on the job is 4% for workers aged 20 to 25 and 1.5% for workers aged 55 to 60. A similar pattern appears
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Figure 12: EE lifecycle profile
di¤erent ages is not used in the calibration, our model is not riggedto t the age prole
of the EE rate.
Now, we can use the model to decompose the age variation of the EE rate into the
contribution of the three workerscharacteristics that vary with age: life-expectancy, match
quality and experience. To this aim, let us decompose the di¤erence between the EE rate
for workers of age t, heet , and the EE rate for workers of age t  1, heet 1, as follows
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(12)
where 
et (z) is the distribution of employed workers of age t across z, 
e
t (yjz) is the dis-
tribution of employed workers of age t across y conditional on z, and pet (z; y) is the prob-
ability that a worker (t; y) in a match of quality z experiences a job-to-job transition, i.e.
in the tenure prole of the EU rate.
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pet (z; y) = [1  dt(z; y)]ep(et (z; y)). The rst term on the right-hand side of (12) is the
di¤erence between the actual EE rate for workers of age t and the counterfactual EE rate
for workers of age t   1 if these workers had the same experience and match quality as
workers of age t. Following Chéron, Hairault and Langot (2007), we shall refer to this term
as the horizon e¤ect of age. The second term on the right-hand side of (12) is the di¤erence
between the EE rate for workers of age t  1 who counterfactually have the same experience
and match quality as workers of age t and the EE rate for workers of age t   1 who coun-
terfactually have the same experience as workers of age t. We shall refer to this term as the
selection e¤ect of age. Finally, the last term on the right-hand side of (12) is the di¤erence
between the EE rate for workers of age t   1 who have the same experience as workers of
age t and the actual EE rate for workers of age t   1. We shall refer to this term as the
experience e¤ect of age.
Figure 13 plots the decomposition of heet  heet 1 into the horizon, selection and experience
e¤ects. The horizon e¤ect is negative because as we discussed in section 3.4 workers with
a shorter work-life expectancy choose to search in submarkets where the vacancy to applicant
ratio is lower (as long as the quality of their current job is not too high). Quantitatively, the
horizon e¤ect is negligible until the age of 50 because a worker with more than 15 years of
remaining work life behaves approximately like a worker with an innite work life. Past the
age of 50, the horizon e¤ect becomes stronger and stronger. The selection e¤ect is negative
because workers of age t are selected into matches of higher quality than workers of age t 1
and as we discussed in section 3.4 workers in higher quality matches choose to search in
submarkets where the vacancy to applicant ratio is lower.18 Quantitatively, the selection
e¤ect is small after the age of 30 because workers who have been in the labor market for
more than 10 years have found high quality matches. Before the age of 30, the selection
e¤ect is quite strong. Finally, the experience e¤ect is positive because workers of age t have
accumulated more experience than workers of age t 1 and as we discussed in section 3.4
workers with more experience choose to search in submarkets where the vacancy to applicant
ratio is higher (as long as the quality of their current job is not too high). Quantitatively,
18Between the ages of 18 and 19, the selection e¤ect is actually positive. This is because most 18 year old
workers who are employed are in matches of unknown quality and, hence, do not have an incentive to search
for better matches. The proportion of 19 year old employed workers who are in matches of unknown quality
is much lower and, for this reason, the selection e¤ect is positive. After the rst year, the main di¤erence
between older and younger worker is that the older ones are employed in better matches.
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Figure 13: EE lifecycle decomposition
though, the experience e¤ect is small.
Figure 13 shows that the large decline in the EE rate for workers between the ages of
20 and 35 is almost entirely attributable to the selection e¤ect of age, i.e. to the fact that
workers move from low to high quality matches as they get older. Figure 13 also shows that
the EE rate for workers between the ages of 35 and 45 is approximately constant because,
in this part of the life cycle, the horizon, selection and experience e¤ects of age are all
negligible. Finally, Figure 13 shows that the decline in the EE rate for workers between the
ages of 45 and 65 is almost entirely attributable to the horizon e¤ect of age, i.e. to the fact
that workerswork-life expectancy falls as they get older.
4.2.2 Lifecycle prole of the EU rate
The age prole of the EU rate predicted by the model is quite close to the age prole of the
EU rate that is observed in the data (see Figure 14). The model correctly predicts that the
EU rate drops dramatically for workers between the ages of 18 and 30 and that it declines
at a much lower rate for older workers. The close t between the age prole predicted by
the model and the one observed in the data is a success for our theory of labor reallocation.
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In fact, even though we used the tenure prole of the EU rate in the calibration, our model
is not necessarily predisposed to t the age prole of the EU rate because the tenure prole
of the EU rate is not the same for workers of di¤erent age.
In order to understand the cause of age variation in the EU rate, we decompose the
di¤erence between the EU rate for workers of age t, heut , and the EU rate for workers of age
t  1, heut 1, as follows
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(13)
The decomposition in (13) is the analogue for the EU rate of the decomposition in (12).
The rst term on the right-hand side of (13) measures the contribution of the change in
work-life expectancy to the change in the EU rate between workers of age t  1 and t. This
is the horizon e¤ect of age. The second term on the right-hand side of (13) measures the
38
contribution of the change in match quality to the change in the EU rate between workers
of age t  1 and t. This is the selection e¤ect of age. Finally, the last term on the right-hand
side of (13) measures the contribution of the change in experience to the change in the EU
rate between workers of age t  1 and t: This is the experience e¤ect of age.
Figure 15 plots the decomposition of heut  heut 1 into the selection, experience and horizon
e¤ects. The horizon e¤ect is rather small throughout the lifecycle. The selection e¤ect is
negative because workers of age t tend to be employed in higher quality matches than workers
of age t   1 and, hence, they are less likely to leave their job. Quantitatively, the selection
e¤ect is quite strong between the ages of 18 and 30, but it becomes negligible afterwards.
Finally, the experience e¤ect is positive early in the life cycle and negative later on. In fact,
workers of age t have more experience than workers of age t  1 and, as illustrated in gure
6, workers with more experience are more likely to leave their job if young and less likely
to leave their job if old. Notice that the magnitude of the experience e¤ect sharply declines
with age because, according to our calibration, the marginal productivity of experience falls
rather quickly.
Figure 15 shows that the sharp decline in the EU rate for workers between the ages of 18
and 30 is attributable to the fact that, during this part of the life cycle, the negative e¤ect
of age on the EU rate through the selection channel is much stronger than its positive e¤ect
through the experience channel. Moreover, Figure 15 shows that the small decline in the EU
rate for workers between the ages of 30 and 65 is due to the fact that, during this part of
the life cycle, the horizon, selection and experience e¤ects of age are all small.
4.2.3 Lifecycle prole of the UE rate
Figure 16 shows that the model also predicts well the empirical age prole of the UE rate.
In fact, the model correctly predicts that the UE rate remains approximately constant for
workers between the ages of 20 and 50 and that the UE rate sharply declines for workers
between the ages of 50 and 65. Since the calibration did not use any data on the age variation
of the UE rate, the fact that the model correctly predicts the empirical age prole of the UE
rate should be seen as another success for our theory.
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Figure 15: EU lifecycle decomposition
In order to understand the causes of the age variation in the UE rate, we decompose the
di¤erence between the UE rate for workers of age t, huet , and the UE rate for workers of age
t  1, huet 1, as follows
huet   huet 1 =
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(14)
where ut (y) is the distribution of unemployed workers of age t across y: The decomposition
in (14) is similar to the decomposition in (12) and (13) for the EE and EU rates. The
rst term on the right-hand side of (14) measures the contribution of the change in work-
life expectancy to the change in the UE rate between workers of age t   1 and t. This
is the horizon e¤ect of age. The second term on the right-hand side of (14) measures the
contribution of the change in experience to the change in the UE rate between workers of
age t  1 and t. This is the experience e¤ect of age. Clearly, age does not a¤ect the UE rate
through its e¤ect on the selection of workers into higher quality matches.
Figure 17 plots the decomposition of huet  huet 1 into the horizon e¤ect and the experience
e¤ect. The horizon e¤ect is negative because as illustrated in gure 4 unemployed workers
with a shorter work-life expectancy choose to search in submarkets where the vacancy to
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Figure 16: UE lifecycle profile
applicant ratio, and, hence, their job nding probability is lower. The experience e¤ect is
positive because workers of age t have more experience than workers of age t   1 and as
gure 4 shows more experienced workers choose to search in submarkets where the vacancy
to applicant ratio and, hence, their job nding probability is higher. Overall, gure 17 shows
that the UE rate is approximately constant for workers between the ages of 20 and 50 because
both the horizon and experience e¤ects are negligible. Moreover, the UE rate declines sharply
for workers between the ages of 50 and 65 because the horizon e¤ect becomes strong, while
the experience e¤ect remains relatively small.
4.3 Application: Decomposing productivity and wage growth
In the previous subsections, we used the model to decompose the age variation in the UE,
EU and EE transition rates into the contribution of the age variation in work-life expectancy,
match quality and experience. Those decompositions shed light on the fundamental causes
of age variation in labor reallocation. In this subsection, we want to use the model to
decompose the age prole of labor productivity and wages.
First, let  denote the productivity of an employed worker. Using the fact that  = zg(y),
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we can decompose the growth rate of average labor productivity between the ages of t   1
and t as follows
[Et log    Et 1 log ] = [Et log g(y)  Et 1 log g(y)]
+ [Et log z   Et 1 log z],
(15)
where Etx denotes the average value of some variable x among workers of age t and Et 1x
denotes the average among workers of age t   1. The rst term on the right-hand side of
(15) measures the growth rate between the ages of t  1 and t of the average human capital
of employed workers. The second term is the growth rate between the ages of t   1 and t
of average match quality of employed workers. Hence, (15) decomposes the growth rate of
labor productivity into the contributions of the growth rates of human capital and of match
quality.
Next, denote as ! the piece-rate for an employed worker and as w his wage. Using the
fact that w = !zg(y), we can decompose the growth rate of the average wage between the
ages of t  1 and t as follows
[Et logw   Et 1 logw] = [Et log g(y)  Et 1 log g(y)]
+ [Et log z   Et 1 log z] + [Et log!   Et 1 log!],
(16)
42
The sum of the rst two terms on the right-hand side of (16) is the growth rate of average
labor productivity among employed workers. The last term on the right-hand side of (16) is
the growth rate of the average piece rate among employed workers. Hence, (16) decomposes
the growth rate of wages into the contribution of the growth rates of human capital, match
quality and workers contractual power.
Figure 18 plots the decomposition of the growth rate of labor productivity into the
contribution of the growth rate of human capital and of match quality. First, notice that
labor productivity growth decreases rapidly with age. Between the ages of 18 and 22, labor
productivity grows by 18 percent per year. Between the ages of 23 and 27, labor productivity
grows by 5.4 percent per year. And between the ages of 28 and 65, average productivity grows
only by .6 percent per year. Second, notice that both the accumulation of human capital
and the increase in match quality are important sources of labor productivity growth. In
particular, between the ages of 18 and 30, the accumulation of human capital accounts for
74 percent, and the increase of match quality accounts for 25 percent of the overall growth
of labor productivity. Finally, Figure 18 shows very clearly that the assignment of the right
workers to the right rms is a process that lasts approximately 10 years, even though both
search and learning frictions are modest.
Figure 19 plots the decomposition of the growth rate of wages into the contribution of the
growth rate of human capital, match quality and workerscontractual power. First, notice
that average wages just like labor productivity are increasing in age, but at a rapidly
decreasing rate. The annual growth rate of wages is 18 percent between the ages of 18 and
22, 5.5 percent between the ages of 23 and 27, and .6 percent between the ages of 28 and 65.
Second, notice that the main engines of wage growth are the accumulation of human capital
and the improvement in match quality, not the increase in workerscontractual power. In
fact, between the ages of 18 and 30, the growth of human capital accounts for 76 percent of
wage growth, the improvement in match quality accounts for 23.8 percent of wage growth,
and the increase in workerscontractual power only accounts for 0.2 percent of wage growth.
The workerscontractual power contributes very little to wage growth because, according to
our calibration, search frictions are small and, hence, workers are always paid wages close to
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Figure 18: Productivity growth decomposition
their marginal product.19
The ndings obtained from the decompositions (15) and (16) reveal the importance of
mismatch in the growth process of productivity and wages over the life cycle. Indeed,
more that 20 percent of the productivity and wage growth that workers experience during
their entire life cycle reects the workersmovement towards a more e¢ cient allocation of
their labor. These ndings have far-reaching implications. For example, they suggest that
labor market policies that hinder workersmobility (e.g. ring costs) have the potential
to dramatically slow down the workersproductivity and wage growth over the life cycle.
Similarly, such policies may signicantly reduce the aggregate level of labor productivity.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a directed search theory of workerstransitions between employ-
ment, unemployment and across employers over the life cycle. The transitions of workers
across di¤erent employment states are driven by di¤erences in the quality of di¤erent rm-
worker matches. The assignment of the right workers to the right rms is time consuming
19Indeed, the average piece rate in the cross-section of workers is 96%.
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Figure 19: Wage growth decomposition
because of the presence of both search and learning frictions. The velocity at which workers
move towards new rms is endogenous because search is directed and, hence, workers choose
whether to seek jobs that o¤er high wages and are hard to nd or jobs that o¤er low wages
and are easy to nd. We calibrated the theory using data on labor reallocation aggregated
across workers of di¤erent ages. We validated the theory by showing that it predicts quite
well the empirical pattern of labor reallocation for workers of di¤erent ages. Finally, we used
the theory to decompose the age variation of transition rates, wages and productivity into
the e¤ect of age variations in work-life expectancy, human capital and match quality.
The model proposed in this paper provides a successful and practical way to introduce
life cycle considerations into macroeconomic analysis of the labor market. The model is
successful because it accounts for the pattern of workers transitions across employment
states over the life cycle. The model is practical because, due to the block recursivity of
the equilibrium, it can be easily solved in the presence of aggregate shocks. In this paper,
we solved the model in the presence of aggregate demographic shocks rather than under the
standard counterfactual assumption of a constant population growth rate. Therefore, we
could have used the model to study how much of the recent slow-down in the growth rate of
wages and labor productivity can be attributed to the ageing of the baby boomers. Similarly,
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Guo (2014) andWee (2014) solved a version of our model with aggregate productivity shocks,
which they used to understand the impact of recessions on the careers of young workers.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: The unemployment value function UT and the employment value
function VT satisfy the equilibrium conditions (iii) and (iv) if and only if
UT (y;  ) = b
VT (z; y;  ) =
(
zg(y), if z = z1; z2; :::zN(z),P
z0 z
0g(y)f(z0), if z = z0.
(A1)
Notice that neither UT nor VT depend on the aggregate state of the economy  . Hence, we
can write UT (y;  ) = U(y) and VT (z; y;  ) = VT (z; y).
The market tightness function T satises the equilibrium condition (ii) if and only if
T (x; y;  ) =
8<: q 1

k
VT (z0; y)  x

; if x  VT (z0; y)  k;
0, else.
(A2)
Notice that T (x; y;  ) depends on the value promised to the workers, x, the worker-specic
productivity, y, but not on the aggregate state of the economy,  . Hence, we can write
T (x; y;  ) = T (x; y).
The unemployment policy function xuT satises the equilibrium condition (iii) if and only if
it solves the search problem
RT (y;  ) = max
x
p(T (x; y)) [x  UT (y)] . (A3)
From (A2), it follows that x = VT (z0; y)   k=q(T (x; y)) for all x  VT (z0; y)   k, and
T (x; y) = 0 for all x > VT (z0; y)   k. Using these equalities, we can rewrite the search
problem (A3) as
RT (y;  ) = max
x
 kT (x; y) + p(T (x; y)) [VT (z0; y)  UT (y)] : (A4)
Since x enters (A4) only through T , we can rewrite the problem as
RT (y;  ) = max
0
 k + p() [VT (z0; y)  UT (y)] : (A5)
The objective function in (A5) is strictly concave in  and does not depend on the aggregate
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state of the economy,  . Hence, (A5) admits a unique solution uT which does not depend
on  , i.e. uT (y;  ) = 
u
T (y). Similarly, RT (y;  ) = RT (y). Given 
u
T , x
u
T must be such that
xuT (y;  ) = VT (z0; y) 
k
q(uT (y))
; if uT (y) > 0;
xuT (y;  )  VT (z0; y)  k; if uT (y) = 0:
(A6)
There are many policy function xuT that solve (A6). However, the only di¤erence between
these policies is the x that the worker chooses when he nds it optimal to visit an empty
submarket. Hence, without loss in generality, we can specialize (A7) to
xuT (y;  ) = VT (z0; y) 
k
q(uT (y))
: (A7)
Notice that xTu does not depend on the aggegate state of the economy  . Hence, we can
write xuT (y;  ) = x
u
T (y).
The employment policy function xeT satises the equilibrium condition (iv) if and only if it
solves the search problem
ST (z; y;  ) = max
x
p(T (x; y))

x  Ez^jzVT (z^; y)

. (A8)
Using (A2), we can rewrite the search problem (A8) as
ST (z; y;  ) = max
0
 k + p() VT (z0; y)  Ez^jzVT (z^; y) : (A9)
The objective function in (A9) is strictly concave in , it depends on the worker-specic
productivity y and on the match-specic productivity z but not on the aggregate state of
the economy,  . Hence, (A9) admits a unique solution eT which depends on y and z but not
on  , i.e. eT (z; y;  ) = 
e
T (z; y). Similarly, ST (z; y;  ) = ST (z; y). Given 
e
T , we can recover
xeT from
xeT (z; y;  ) = VT (z0; y) 
k
q(eT (z; y))
: (A10)
Again, note that xTe depends on the worker-specic productivity, y, the match-specic
productivity, z, but not on the aggregate state of the economy,  . Hence, we can write
xeT (z; y;  ) = x
e
T (z; y).
The employment policy function dT satises the equilibrium condition (iv) if and only if it
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solves the separation problem
max
d2[;1]
dUT (y) + (1  d)

Ez^jzVT (z^; y) + eST (z; y)

: (A11)
The objective function in (A11) is linear in d, it depends on the worker-specic productivity,
y, and on the match-specic productivity, z, but not on the aggregate state of the economy,
 . Hence, (A11) admits generally a unique solution dT which depends on y and z but not
on  , i.e. dT (z; y;  ) = dT (z; y).
The unemployment value function UT 1 satises the equilibrium condition (iii) if and only if
UT 1(y;  ) = b+  [UT (y) + uRT (y)] : (A12)
Similarly, the employment value function VT 1 satises the equilibrium condition (iv) if and
only if for z = z1; z2; :::zN(z) we have
VT 1(z; y;  ) = zg(y) +  max
d2[;1]

dUT (y^) + (1  d)

Ez^jzVT (z^; y^) + eST (z; y^)
	
, (A13)
and for z = z0 we have
Vt(z0; y;  ) = 
P
z VT 1(z; y)f(z) + (1  )
P
z zg(y)f(z)
+(1  ) max
d2[;1]

dUT (y^) + (1  d)

Ez^jz0VT (z^; y^) + eST (z0; y^)
	
. (A14)
Notice that neither UT 1 nor VT 1 depend on the aggregate state of the economy  . Hence,
we can write UT 1(y;  ) = UT 1(y) and VT 1(z; y;  ) = VT 1(z; y).
By repeating the above steps, it is straightforward to establish that the remaining equilibrium
value and policy functions are uniquely determined by the equilibrium conditions (ii), (iii)
and (iv) and that they are all independent of the aggregate state of the economy  . Hence,
an equilibrium exists, is unique and it is block recursive. The proof of the e¢ ciency of the
equilibrium follows the same steps as the proof of part (iii) of Theorem 2 in Menzio and Shi
(2011) and is therefore omitted. 
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.Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Description Value
 discount factor .9967
b home productivity 2.311
k vacancy cost 22.99
u o¤ the job search 1.000
e on the job search .7048
 exogenous destruction .0002
 scale match productivity 11.24
 shape match productivity 3.464
 match productivity learning .2640
 match productivity shock .0094
1 human capital function 4.297
2 human capital function .0655
Table 2: Average Transitions
UE EU EE
Data .259 .0054 .0186
Model .233 .0076 .0138
Table 3: Cumulative Transitions by Tenure
Tenure EU data EU model EE data EE model
4 months .130 .158 .117 .092
8 months .173 .208 .211 .202
12 months .195 .226 .273 .284
2 years .229 .243 .393 .406
5 years .265 .269 .563 .492
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Table 4: Log Wages by Age
Age Data Model Age Data Model
21 0.728 0.775 42 1.320 1.283
24 0.931 0.959 45 1.348 1.302
27 1.034 1.076 48 1.293 1.318
30 1.127 1.146 51 1.328 1.332
33 1.188 1.196 54 1.362 1.342
36 1.262 1.233 57 1.397 1.350
39 1.299 1.261 60 1.311 1.353
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